І. M. Вебер и его «Протестантская этика и дух капитализма» - umotnas.ru o_O
І. M. Вебер и его «Протестантская этика и дух капитализма» - umotnas.ru o_O
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І. M. Вебер и его «Протестантская этика и дух капитализма» - страница №1/1
Модуль 4 Возможности применения веберовского похода при изучении межконфессиональных отношений на Юге Украины І. M.Вебер и его «Протестантская этика и дух капитализма». Темы для обсуждения:
Рекомендованная литература для чтения: Вебер М. Протестантская этика и дух капитализма. — М., 2003. Вебер М. Протестантська етика і дух капіталізму / Перекл. з німецької О. Погорілого. — К.: Основи, 1994. — 261 с. Marshall T. H. Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait by Reinhard Bendix // The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Jun., 1961), pp. 184-188. ІІ. Критика веберовского подхода к изучению религизных факторов Темы для обсуждения: Рекомендованная литература для чтения: Kalberg Stephen. On the Neglect of Weber's Protestant Ethic as a Theoretical Treatise: Demarcating the Parameters of Postwar American Sociological Theory // Sociological Theory, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Mar., 1996), pp. 49-70. Although widely recognized as one of sociology's true classics, Max Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism has largely failed to influence the development of sociological theory in the United States. Because it has been read almost exclusively as a study of the "role of ideas" in economic development, its diverse and multifaceted theoretical contributions generally have been neglected. This study explic- itly calls attention to The Protestant Ethic as a theoretical treatise by examining this classic in reference to four major debates in postwar sociological theory in the United States. Moreover, it demarcates an array of major parameters in American theorizing. The conclusion speculates upon the reasons for the strong opposition to The Protestant Ethic's theoretical lessons and argues that a style of theorizing unique to sociology in the United States has erected firm barriers against this classic text. Crespi Franco. Max Weber Insights and Errors by S. Andreski L'ordine infranto-Max Weber e i limiti del razionalismo by Alessandro Dal Lago Calvinism and the Capitalist Spirit: Max Weber's Protestant Ethic by Gianfranco Poggi // European Sociological Review, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Dec., 1985), pp. 250-252. 'What should we learn from Weber to advance farther?' is the question that underlies the book by Stanislav Andreski, who rightly wants to develop a critique of Weber falling neither into pure 'ancestor worship' nor into a kind of aggressive 'patricide'. This attitude could certainly be very stimulating, but Andreski's discussion more than once raises some perplexities. It is of course well known that Weber's writings are often unclear and convoluted, that his language lacks precision, and that his works are far from systematic. There could be good reasons to try to set forth what constitutes the essential and more solid part of his contribution to sociological theory. In order to do this, however, it would be necessary not only to examine thoroughly the concepts used by Weber, but also to understand their meaning in relation to the historical and cultural context in which they were first formulated. In many parts of his essay, Andreski appears more interested in making his own methodological and theoretical positions clear than in reaching a deeper level of interpretation of Weber's thinking. Submitting the Weberian language to an analysis inspired by neo-positivism and operationalism, Andreski's insights are often lacking in historical and cultural sophisti- cation. As a consequence, the reader is put in an ambivalent situation: on the one hand, Andreski's personal positions appear well founded, yet on the other, one cannot avoid the feeling that his interpretation of Weber is in many respects misleading and reductive. For example, Andreski criticises the Weberian concept of Verstehen by referring only very superficially to the distinction between Geisteswissenschaften and Natur- wissenschaften and to the cultural context in which the distinction between to explain (Erklaren) and to understand was formulated, first by Droysen and then by Dilthey. This prevents him from giving adequate weight to the relationship between understanding and the problem of meaning (Sinn), and between the latter and the objectivated products of culture. Andreski is absolutely right when he asserts that 'our ability to explain is the best criterion of our understanding in the sense of possession of adequate knowledge' (p. 28), but this doesn't in any sense clarify the reasons why it was so important to Weber to define his sociology as verstehenden in order to oppose it to the positivistic and organic approach, which was oriented to the finding of systemic causal laws. To say that Weber had not clearly perceived that science 'begins where empathic comprehension no longer suffices' (p. 32) is to ignore the fact that Weber was the first to stress the inadequacy of Diltheyan Einfiihlung in order to develop a scientific analysis of social action. It is also to underestimate his effort to establish the concepts of objectivity and of causality on a new basis. Perhaps if Andreski had given more attention to Weber's methodological essays on the problem of objectivity (1904) and on the categories of verstehenden Soziologie (1913), this important point would have received a more adequate treatment. In the same way, Andreski's criticism of the Weberian distinction between goal-rational and value- rational seems to miss the point. It is true that Weber never explains clearly enough the difference between goal and value; but if Andreski is right in declaring that today it would be preferable to refer only to goals- since values are, after all, nothing but goals-it is also true that in the cultural context in which Weber was writing, that distinction was of capital consequence. To stress, in contrast to positivism, that rationality is not necessarily utilitarian or instrumental, but that to act in the name of values (religious, ethical, aesthetical, etc.) can also be rational, represents a breakthrough, the importance of which at that time can be seen from a comparison with Pareto's dichotomic typology of action: here the only rational action is the logico- experimental one, while all other kinds of action are considered non-logical or irrational. On the other hand, Weber (as is stressed by the other two authors here reviewed) showed that every goal is a value and that even what appears as the typical 'rational behavior' (i.e. economic behavior) is, in the last analysis, determined by arbitrarily chosen values, such as for example, the goal of constantly increasing productivity. This demonstrates that the distinction between goal-rational and value-rational was important for Weber not as a distinction between goals and values (since he recognised their interchangeability), but as a distinction between different forms of rationality. Unfortunately, it is precisely in this essential point and in Weber's concept of rationalisation that Andreski's interpretation appears most misleading. Although he recognizes that Weber was neither a progressivist nor an optimist, in his critique of the concept of rationalisation Andreski seems to undervalue the relative, and often also negative, meaning that the term had for Weber. He also seems to miss the deep roots that connect this term to Nietzsche's philosophy. Andreski goes on objecting to Weber's use of the concept of rationalisation as an equivalent of scientific and technical progess by asserting that there are many other kinds of rationality, but it is well known that Weber was convinced of the conventional character of rationality and that he had no intention whatsoever of assuming science or technique to be a universal criterion of it. For Weber, rationalisation was just a specific historical and cultural process which happened to consider instrumental rationality as the unique form of rationality. To accuse Weber of having a narrow concept of rationality seems paradoxical in this perspective. Obviously this attitude also prevents Andreski from understanding the sense in which Weber could trace the progess of rationalisation through Judaism and Christianity. The Weberian analysis of this process can certainly be criticised on historical and cultural grounds, but it is first necessary to understand its real meaning. One way to this is to trace the connections between Weber's position and Nietzsche's specific interpretation of the nihilistic character of the metaphysical and theological tradition of Western civilisation, an interpretation that has influenced not only Weber, but, among many others, Heidegger. In this context rationalisation acquires a negative meaning which is present in Weber even when he considers the fatality but in some way also the beauty of the phenomenon. To say, as Andreski does, that 'the only definite idea which can plausibly be traced to Nietzsche's influence is Weber's concept of charisma', (p. 107) sounds like an amazing oversimplification. It is only by being aware that for Weber the term rationalisation refers to an arbitrarily selected form of determination that it is possible to see the real meaning of some of the Weberian distinctions. For instance, as regards the problem of charisma and legitimation, it is not true, as Andreski will have it, that in Weber legality is, without qualification, equivalent to legitimacy (p. 97). On the contrary, if the relative character that the concept of legitimation has for Weber is taken into account, it appears that for Weber legality is only one of the possible forms of legitimation and that what is legal does not automatically result in a legitimation of power, nor that legitimation is necessarily legal. In the case of pure charismatic power, for instance, law not only is not the basis of legitimation but can be an obstacle to it. In the end, one is not so sure that Andreski has succeeded in avoiding, as was his intention, a-however unconscious-'patricidal' attitude towards Weber. Alessandro Dal Lago's approach to Weber is in many respects the opposite of Andreski's, although even Dal Lago's analysis can be seen as an attempt to go farther than Weber in the interpretation of contemporary society-a society 'which shows more and more, in addition to the rationalistic structures, a multitude of "gratuitous" (not connected with problems of survival) or "irrational" forms of behavior'. In fact, Dal Lago appreciates in Weber 'the lines of a social theory which is not bound to merely rationalistic presuppositions' (p. 34). Dal Lago stresses the influence of Nietzsche's nihilism as one of the most relevant elements at the origin of Weber's attitude towards the modern world. Nihilism in this case does not necessarily mean irrationalism, but refers to the experience of the breaking up of all traditional values and to the impossibility of refounding our knowledge on absolute grounds or universal frames of reference. On the one hand, this explains Weber's perception of a plurality of values and of the conflict among them in modern society (see the theme of the conflict of Gods in Science as a Vocation). On the other hand, it explains why Weber recognized that at the origin of any form of knowledge, science included, there are always some non-rational presuppositions. The rational and determinate forms of the different sciences were indeed considered by Weber as 'artificial' or conventional and as limited (see Dal Lago, p. 40 f.). In this context, rationalisation appears as the process through which 'the specificity of Western rationality' has found its historical expression. For Weber, as Dal Lago explains, the term rationalisation indicates the way in which a concrete cultural phenomenon, in itself substantially non-rational, is regulated by norms and transformed so as to become, at least to a certain degree, predictable. It is for this reason that the term rational has for Weber a purely conventional meaning and can also be applied to religious, mystical or even magical forms. The progressive emergence of a purely utilitarian or instrumental mundane rationalism, once any ascetic or religious motivation has been lost, is seen by Weber as a threat to the survival of individualism, for the value of the individual is no longer protected by any transcendent reference or any humanistic tradition. This leads Weber to perceive a characteristic gap between rationalisation-as the level where means are adapted to ends-and meaning (Sinn)-as the level of the general orientation which gives sense to life. This gap is, as Dal Lago shows, at the origin of Weber's view of the tragic destiny of Western man both from the existential or cultural aspect and from the social or political one. Political life appears to Weber as ruined by the pervasive 'flattening' action of bureaucratisation: rationalisation becomes thus an 'iron cage' where the individual loses his freedom and becomes alienated. According to Dal Lago, Weber's rationalisation theme is perfectly consistent with his recognition of the radically non-rational character of the (indispensable) value-choices which stand at the origin of every human experience. From a methodological point of view, this leads to the use of rationalistic models as instruments for reaching limited forms of empirical knowledge. It is precisely for this perspective that Weber still appears an important point of reference. His attempt to maintain an empirical 'objective' dimension to knowledge, despite the limitations of our intellectual capacities, leads to an approach which is an alternative both to positivism and to historical relativism. The book by Gianfranco Poggi, Calvinism and Capitalist Spirit, is an attempt to reconsider and to test once more the validity of Weber's specific hypothesis about the influence of Protestantism on the origins of Capitalism. Through a careful analysis of the Weberian text, Poggi correctly shows (as Dal Lago too has done) that in Weber the concept of goal, being connected to an existential choice, is essentially a non-rational option even when it appears as an economic goal oriented to the increase of capital gain. This opens up the possibility of finding a non-rational or irrational origin of the very 'rational' systems which emerge in the historical process as concrete forms of specific determination. On the other hand, Poggi points out that Weber was perfectly aware of the presence of multi-causality and did not intend to establish a monocausal relation between the spirit of capitalism and the capitalistic structures of the modern world. Even if Weber has failed to demonstrate that the spirit of capitalism has given a partial but meaningful and indispensable causal contribution to the birth of capitalism, Poggi thinks that Weber's hypothesis must be taken into account as a very serious endeavor. In this perspective Poggi defines this hypothesis as 'partial, complex and momentous'. Partial, because Weber's intention was to show a specific and relatively minor aspect of a very wide historical phenomenon; complex, because it refers to a rather large number of aspects or 'discrete points'; momentous, because, according to Poggi, its partiality paradoxically increases its theoretical weight. It is precisely because Weber's hypothesis is presented as one of the possible keys for interpreting a complex reality that it appears today valuable from a methodological point of view, especially if it is compared with Marx's attempt to establish a monocausal relationship between the economic structure and the socio-cultural infrastruc- ture. Throughout his thesis Weber established a more correct balance between the different variables (economical, symbolic, ideological, etc.) which interact in the historical and social situation, thus eliminating any dogmatic claim from sociological interpretation. Poggi's and Dal Lago's books show how it is possible to clarify the inner logic of Weber's works without ignoring the complexity and the ambivalence which is still making them extremely stimulating for contem- porary sociology. After all, we must recognize that the two main problems which were at the origin of Weber's thinking are still alive today: the epistemological problem of the specific nature of scientific knowledge or of the meaning of objectivity, a question which nowadays is increasingly conceptualized in the hermeneutical terms of conventional intersubjective communication, and the existential problem of man's chances to escape the suffocating determinism of utilitarian rationality in order to find more meaningful or 'substantial' forms of rationality, despite the absence of any kind of metaphysical foundation. Perhaps the most important lesson we may learn from Weber lies in his capacity to keep alive the tension between the contradictory dimensions of social life (rationalisation versus life-meaningfulness; individualism versus formali- sation, etc.) without refusing to accept this ambivalence even if this means to face directly the ultimately irreconcilable character of the social situation as such. Franco Crespi University of Perugia, Italy Rotenberg Mordechai. The Protestant Ethic against the Spirit of Psychiatry: The Other Side of Weber's Thesis // The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Mar., 1975), pp. 52-65. Means Richard L. Weber's Thesis of the Protestant Ethic: The Ambiguities of Received Doctrine // The Journal of Religion, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Jan., 1965), pp. 1-11. We have been engaged in an extensive study of Protestantism in American social research. Our studies indicate that Weber's theory of the "Protestant ethic," or some variant of that theory, is the central interpretive notion used to explain empirical correlations between Protestantism and various forms of behavior. The major idea in Weber's thesis is that Protestantism established the necessary conditions for the rise of capitalism. Weber's theory is provocative and complex, but its use may involve a certain amount of ambiguity. One of the most puzzling aspects of the situation is that current sociological research both contradicts and sustains the theory. Another interesting fact is that the theory is used time and time again with little documentation to prove or support its controversial nature among historians In other words, the theory seems to take on the characteristics of "received doctrine." Kent Stephen A. In Search of the Spirit of Capitalism: An Essay on Max Weber's Protestant Ethic Thesis by Gordon Marshall // Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Dec., 1983), pp. 388-390. Little David. Max Weber Revisited: The "Protestant Ethic" and the Puritan Experience of Order // The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Oct., 1966), pp. 415-428. Cohen Jere. The Problem of Evidence in the Protestant Ethic Controversy // Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 12, No. 6 (Nov., 1983), pp. 624-625. Roth Guenther. Current Trends in Weber Interpretation // Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Jul., 1984), pp. 403-406. Drysdale John. Weber's Protestant Ethic: Origins, Evidence, Contexts. by Hartmut Lehmann ; Guenther Roth // Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Jul., 1995), pp. 422-423. Coleman D. C. In Search of the Spirit of Capitalism: An Essay on Max Weber's Protestant Ethic Thesis. by Gordon Marshall. The Spirit of Capitalism: The Max Weber Thesis in an Economic Historical Perspective. By Hisao Otsuka ; Masaomi Kondo // The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 46, No. 2, The Tasks of Economic History (Jun., 1986), pp. 577-579. Clavero Bartolomé. Weber's Protestant Ethic: Origins, Evidence, Contexts by Hartmut Lehmann; Guenther Roth; Hartmut Lehmann; Kenneth F. Ledford Max Weber's Comparative-Historical Sociology by Stephen Kalberg // The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Mar., 1996), pp. 160-162. Rowse A. L. Max Weber: The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. by Talcott Parsons ; R. H. Tawney // The Economic Journal, Vol. 41, No. 161 (Mar., 1931), pp. 133-135. Means Richard L. Protestantism and Economic Institutions: Auxiliary Theories to Weber's Protestant Ethic // Social Forces, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Mar., 1966), pp. 372-381. Historical analysis, including Weber's thesis, offers rich clues to the complexity and variety of relations existing between Protestant religious institutions and economic institutions. Several of the relationships between Protestantism and Western economic institutions are outlined. These relationships are mediated through Protestant historical traditions left unexplained by Weber's emphasis upon the religious doctrines of predestination (election) and the calling. Protestant views on (a) Education, (b) its own Minority Status, (c) Liberty and Freedom, and (d) Social Reform, suggest hypotheses to analyze when studying American Protestantism. The validity of interpretations of present-day Protestant life hold only if the methods of col- lecting data permit alternative properties to exhibit themselves. Hammond Phillip. E. Weber's Protestant Ethic: Origins, Evidence, Contexts. by Hartmut Lehmann ; Guenther Roth // Social Forces, Vol. 73, No. 3 (Mar., 1995), pp. 1119-1120. Baehr Peter. The "Iron Cage" and the "Shell as Hard as Steel": Parsons, Weber, and the Stahlhartes Gehause Metaphor in the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism // History and Theory, Vol. 40, No. 2 (May, 2001), pp. 153-169. In the climax to The Protestant Ethic, Max Weber writes of the stahlhartes Gehiuse that modern capitalism has created, a concept that Talcott Parsons famously rendered as the "iron cage." This article examines the status of Parsons's canonical translation; the puta- tive sources of its imagery (in Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress); and the more complex idea that Weber himself sought to evoke with the "shell as hard as steel": a reconstitution of the human subject under bureaucratic capitalism in which "steel" becomes emblematic of modernity. Steel, unlike the "element" iron, is a product of human fabrication. It is both hard and potentially flexible. Further, whereas a cage confines human agents, but leaves their powers otherwise intact, a "shell" suggests that modern capitalism has created a new kind of being. After examining objections to this interpretation, I argue that whatever the problems with Parsons's "iron cage" as a rendition of Weber's own metaphor, it has become a "traveling idea," a fertile coinage in its own right, an intriguing example of how the translator's imagination can impose itself influentially on the text and its readers Rodgers Daniel T. Democracy, Mediocrity, and the Spirit of Max Weber // Reviews in American History, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Dec., 1980), pp. 465-470. Parker William. N. The Spirit of Capitalism and the Protestant Ethic: An Enquiry into the Weber Thesis. By Michael H. Lessnoff // The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Jun., 1997), pp. 578-579. Delacroix Jacques. The Protestant Ethic Debate: Max Weber's Replies to His Critics, 1907 to 1910 by David J. Chalcraft ; Austin Harrington ; Mary Shields // Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Jan., 2003), pp. 119-120. Jacob Margaret C. and Kadane Matthew Missing, Now Found in the Eighteenth Century: Weber's Protestant Capitalist // The American Historical Review, Vol. 108, No. 1 (Feb., 2003), pp. 20-49. Besnard Philippe. In Search of the Spirit of Capitalism. An Essay on Max Weber's Protestant Ethic Thesis by Gordon Marshall. Judasme et capitalisme. Essai sur la controverse entre Max Weber et Werner Sombart by Freddy Raphal // Revue française de sociologie, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1984), pp. 166-168. Tropman John. In Search of the Spirit of Capitalism: An Essay on Max Weber's Protestant Ethic Thesis by Gordon Marshall // Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Winter, 1984), pp. 323-324. Weiss Johannes. Calvinism and the Capitalist Spirit: Max Weber's Protestant Ethic by Gianfranco Poggi // Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Summer, 1985), pp. 330-332. Baker Patrick. L. Religion and Economic Action: The Protestant Ethic, the Rise of Capitalism and the Abuses of Scholarship by Kurt Samuelsson ; E. Geoffrey French. The Spirit of Capitalism and the Protestant Ethic: An Enquiry into the Weber Thesis by Michael H. Lessnoff // Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Winter, 1997), pp. 144-147. Bourg Carroll. J. Calvinism and the Capitalist Spirit: Max Weber's Protestant Ethic by Gianfranco Poggi // Sociological Analysis, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Summer, 1985), pp. 185-186. Swatos William H., Jr. In Search of the Spirit of Capitalism: An Essay on Max Weber's Protestant Ethic Thesis by Gordon Marshall // Sociological Analysis, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Autumn, 1983), pp. 263-264. Berger Stephen D. The Sects and the Breakthrough into the Modern World: On the Centrality of the Sects in Weber's Protestant Ethic Thesis // The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Autumn, 1971), pp. 486-499. THE PROBLEM Of the kind of social organization necessary to bring about radical social change was raised by Marx in 1843-1844 in his essay on Hegel's philosophy of law. In this essay Marx specified the kind of social organization capable of bringing about the total, socialist revolution as the proletariat, a class, in society but not of it, conscious of itself and of its enemies, and organized as a party. (See also Marx and Engels, 1848). In the historical development of Marxism, Marx' answer was reinforced, but also narrowed and specified, by Lenin's classical (1902) formulation of the revolutionary cadre party. In a world in which many now talk of revolution, both in the "Third World," and even in modem indus- trialized countries, it may be of some use to re-examine the question of the kind of social organization involved in generating radical social change, and to re- examine the Marxist answer. My strategy in this paper is to attack the problem indirectly, by reexamining Max Weber's discussion of the role of certain kinds of Protestant groups in the rise of the capitalist world. I shall try to justify this indirect strategy at the paper's conclusion. The Weber thesis has been with us for a long time. It has been sharply attacked and stoutly defended, but when one tries to sift through the resulting pile-up, it is not very clear who has won (or gained) and to continue the football metaphor, who has lost. I suggest that one reason for this lack of accumulation of accepted results is a lack of clarity about what the Weber thesis asserts, and consequently, about how it is to be tested. It is now reasonably clear (see Bendix, 1967), and should always have been clear, that Weber's theoretical contribution lay not in the assertion of a causal connection between Protestantism and capitalism, but in proposing the mediating agencies, the intervening variables, to explain (and specify) a causal connection which he (and nearly everyone else) took for granted. The crucial issue, there- fore, is the nature of these proposed mediating agencies. Generally speaking, in- terpreters of Weber have seen this connection as either psychological or cultural in nature. I will try to make plausible the assertion that the connection is largely to be seen in structural/organizational terms, and that Weber, too, saw the connec- tion in this way. In short, my thesis is that the social organization of the sect is the The Sects in Weber's Protestant Ethic Thesis 487 crucial link between Protestant theology and its vicissitudes, on the one hand, and the rise of the capitalist spirit, on the other Lindbekk Tore. In Search of the Spirit of Capitalism by Gordon Marshall The Spirit of Capitalism and the Protestant Ethic by Michael H. Lessnoff Weber's Protestant Ethic. Origins, Evidence, Contexts by H. Lehmann ; G. Roth // Acta Sociologica, Vol. 40, No. 3 (1997), pp. 315-317. Ringer Fritz. Weber's Protestant Ethic: Origins, Evidence, Contexts by Hartmut Lehmann ; Guenther Roth // Central European History, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1994), pp. 241-244. Roth Guenther. The Young Max Weber: Anglo-American Religious Influences and Protestant Social Reform in Germany // International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Summer, 1997), pp. 659-671. Kaelber Lutz. Max Weber's "Protestant Ethic" in the 21st Century // International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Fall, 2002), pp. 133-146. Turner Charles. The Protestant Ethic Debate // International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Fall, 2002), pp. 147-151. Whimster Sam. The Protestant Ethic Turns 100: Essays on the Centenary of the Weber Thesis by William H. Swatos Jr.; Lutz Kaelber // Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Jul., 2006), pp. 423-425. ІІІ. Проникновение идей Реформаторства на юг Украины Темы для обсуждения:
Рекомендованная литература для чтения: Бойко А. Південна Україна останньої чверті ХVІІІ століття. Аналіз джерел. — К., 2000. — 308 с. Дружинина Е.И. Северное Причерноморье в 1775 – 1800 гг. — М.: изд. Академии наук СССР, 1959. — 277 с. Жук С.И. Немецкая диаспора XVIII в. и колонизация Приднепровья (теоретические аспекты социокультурной истории) // Вопросы германской истории. Украинско-немецкие связи в новое и новейшее время. Межвузовский сборник научных трудов. — Днепропетровск: Издательство ДГУ, 1995. — С. 16 – 29. Евангельское движение в Российской империи (1850-1917): Екатеринославская губерния: (Сборник документов и материалов) / Сост. и ред. О.В.Безносова. - Днепропетровск; Штайнхаген: «Samencorn», 2006. – 320 с. Безносова О.В. Немецкие проповедники-миссионеры и их роль в распространении протестантизма в Украине // Малочисленные национальности Юга Украины. История и современность: Тезисы к областной научно-практической конференции 19-20 сентября 1990 г. – Запорожье: ЗДУ, 1990. – С. 21-22. Безносова О.В. Роль немецких колонистов и меннонитов в распространении протестантизма среди православного населения Украины во второй половине ХІХ в. // Вопросы германской истории: Межвузовский сборник научных трудов. – Днепропетровск: ДГУ, 1996. – С.76-86. IV. Хозяйственное развитие Юга Украины и его взаимосвязь с конфессиональной принадлежностью населения региона Темы для обсуждения:
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